American University Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 5

Article 3

2008

Resolved, Or Is It? The First Amendment and
Giving Money to Terrorists
Jeff Breinholt
jeffrey.breinholt@usdoj.gov

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Breinholt, Jeff. “Resolved, Or Is It? The First Amendment and Giving Money to Terrorists.” American University Law Review 57, no.5
( June 2008): 1273-1290.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Resolved, Or Is It? The First Amendment and Giving Money to Terrorists
Keywords

First Amendment, Counterterrorism, Terrorist, Private Action

This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol57/iss5/3

ARTICLES
RESOLVED, OR IS IT? THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND GIVING MONEY TO
TERRORISTS
JEFF BREINHOLT∗

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.......................................................................................1273
I. The Easy Principle in Counterterrorism ................................1275
II. Giving Money to Terrorists .....................................................1278
III. What About Private Actions Against Terrorist Financiers? ...1281
Conclusion .........................................................................................1289

INTRODUCTION
Americans are governed by a concept known as the “rule of law.” It
is an idea we embrace so passionately that we seek to instill it in
developing countries. One of the hallmarks of the rule of law in
Anglo-American thinking is legal certainty: the concept that the
“government in all its actions is [to be] bound by rules fixed and
1
announced beforehand.” These fixed rules include the freedom of
expression and association and the recognition that the act of giving

∗ Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Law, International
Assessment and Strategy Center, on a one-year leave of absence from the
Counterterrorism Section of the U.S. Department of Justice. The views in this Article
are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the Department of Justice.
1. GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 6
(Basic Books 1979) (quoting FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1976)).
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money is sometimes protected from government infringement
2
because it involves these freedoms.
This legal certainty, of course, does not mean that the government
may not regulate financial transactions, as we have many federal
agencies doing just that. Rather, it means that official actions cannot
unduly infringe on “expressive association,” lest these actions be
3
ruled unconstitutional. Legal certainty is achieved by seeing how
courts have judged government actions in the face of claims that
those actions violate the First Amendment.
This Article seeks to show that legal certainty has been achieved in
an arena that is very important: whether the U.S. government can
limit the giving of money to terrorist groups. In this field, there is a
regulatory regime, a series of statutes, and a corpus of prosecutions
and civil lawsuits arising from these laws that the American courts
4
have found to comport with the First Amendment. The test for legal
certainty is relatively easy, if one agrees that the question is binary:
either the enactment of a particular rule or law, or government
action in initiating a criminal prosecution or permitting a private civil
action, is constitutional, or it is not. The cases where these
arguments are considered provide the answer. It is just a matter of
keeping score until it gets rather lopsided and then declaring a
5
winner and concluding that the constitutional issue has been settled.
At that point, people know exactly what is prohibited, to the extent
there was any doubt.
If legal certainty has been achieved, why do we still see claims that
the United States’ actions in the counterterrorism field violate the
First Amendment? Good question. The only explanation is that
there are still lawyers and legal strategists engaging in wishful
thinking, almost to the point of bad faith. The problem with this
practice, beyond wasting judicial resources, is the inconsistency, since
their arguments—if accepted—would take the United States away

2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Yet this Court has never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money
operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment.”).
3. See id. at 25 (stating that there is a fundamental right to free speech and
freedom of association protected by the Constitution, which the government can
abridge but only if its abridgement survives strict scrutiny analysis).
4. See, e.g., id. at 143 (holding congressional action limiting an individual’s free
speech via campaign contributions to be constitutional).
5. By this statement, I do not mean to imply that there are no more
constitutional controversies in American counterterrorism efforts. Rather, I am
asserting that certain aspects of these efforts are now constitutionally settled, as
described in this Article.
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from the goal of the rule of law and jeopardize legal tools about
which these strategists themselves are enthusiastic.
This Article seeks to illustrate this point. Part I describes the easy
cases on constitutional counterterrorism in America. Part II takes
them a step further and discusses the constitutional challenges as
American counterterrorism efforts have sought to reach the nonviolent actors in the terrorist infrastructure, by attacking the act of
giving money. Part III considers the next constitutional battlefield
and explains why people who continue to push the view that terrorist
financing cannot be constitutionally targeted through legal
proceedings will, if successful, eliminate remedies they themselves
enjoy.
I.

THE EASY PRINCIPLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM

In counterterrorism and the First Amendment, there is an easy
principle:
One cannot rely on the First Amendment to defend
oneself from being punished for engaging in politically inspired
6
violence. This is true even though the First Amendment arguably
protects political expression more than other types of speech-related
7
conduct. For example, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman failed in his
attempt to cloak his violent conduct in First Amendment-protected
8
9
activity, as did American jihadist John Walker Lindh. They each
10
11
acted according to their religious beliefs. Both are now in prison.
What about people whose conduct was further removed from
violence? In Virginia after 9/11, Sheik Ali al-Timimi was convicted of

6. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting
that Rahman’s challenge to his conviction—arguing that the Seditious Conspiracy
Statute violated his freedom of speech—was not a valid claim).
7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (“The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
8. See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 114 (arguing that the seditious conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2384, was facially unconstitutional and overbroad and that his conviction
“rested solely on his political views and religious practices”).
9. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“There
is, in other words, a clear line between the First Amendment protected activity and
criminal conduct for which there is no constitutional protection.”).
10. See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 103 (describing Rahman as a Islamic scholar and
cleric leading a jihad against the enemies of Islam and as viewing the United States as
the primary oppressor of Muslims); Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 565–66 (highlighting
Lindh’s contention that he provided services to the Taliban for religious reasons in
contrast to others who did so for non-religious reasons).
11. See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 111 (sentencing Rahman to life in prison); Lindh,
227 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (sentencing Lindh to 240 months in prison).
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soliciting his adherents to travel abroad to engage in violence. A key
factor in judging his First Amendment challenge was whether his
speech, which occurred in the context of a religious sermon, was
13
This concept is a settled one and originated in
“imminent.”
14
Brandenburg v. Ohio, where a Ku Klux Klan leader was prosecuted
under an Ohio statute that criminalized being a member of an
organization that advocated criminal syndicalism (terrorism as a
15
means of effecting political change). It was in Brandenburg that the
Supreme Court issued these famous words:
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. . . . A statute which fails to draw this
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its
condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from
16
governmental control.

So there you have it, some element of legal certainty:
Statutes
that criminalize advocacy, and prosecutions arising out of them, are
only constitutional if they include within their scope only speech that
17
Did Sheik alreaches the incitement of imminent lawlessness.
Timimi’s prosecution qualify? As Professor Wayne McCormack has
noted, the al-Timimi case unquestionably pushes the envelope of
incitement law because al-Timimi’s actions were “at least two steps
18
However, it did not help alremoved from physical violence.”
Timimi’s constitutional arguments that some of his adherents actually
complied with his words and in fact traveled abroad to engage in
19
violence.
Not only was the threat imminent, but it actually
20
happened.
12. See United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 369 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating
that Ali al-Timimi was convicted of solicitation to levy war, among other things, in
2005).
13. See generally Robert S. Tanenbaum, Comment, Preaching Terror: Free Speech or
Wartime Incitement?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 785 (2006) (discussing the al-Timimi conviction
and whether his speech was protected by his First Amendment rights or prohibited as
unlawful incitement).
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
15. Id. at 444–45.
16. Id. at 447–48.
17. See id.
18. WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 122 (LexisNexis
2007).
19. See Indictment of Defendant at 6–8, United States v. Al-Timimi, No. 1:04cr385
(E.D. Va. 2004), available at http://www.milnet.com/terr-prosecutions/al-
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So speech that threatens violence may be constitutionally
prosecuted. Consider a case from a few years ago in which a
defendant was convicted of cross-burning with “an intent to
21
intimidate.” In upholding the conviction, over First Amendment
objections, the Supreme Court recognized that the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing fear:
“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals
from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that fear
engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.” Intimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true
threat, where the speaker directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
22
or death.

Thus, we can draw the line between protected and proscribed
speech, even where the speech is political and therefore entitled to
23
the highest degree of First Amendment protection. For example,
the ability to vocalize one’s disagreement with the President is surely
24
one of the key objects of the First Amendment.
That does not
prevent the government from prosecuting someone for the crime of
25
threatening the life of the President, an essentially verbal crime.
Even if the threat is merely an expression of political disagreement,
26
For
the government can constitutionally punish these speakers.
example, in the case of a threat to the President, the Secret Service is
deployed at the mere mention of the prospect. This vigilance is
Timimi_indict.pdf (recounting al-Timimi’s instructions to others that training in
Pakistan was appropriate, as well as how to reach the camp undetected, and the
individual’s actions in reaching the training camp).
20. On appeal, al-Timimi moved to have his conviction vacated and remanded,
and the court granted his motion. United States v. Al-Timimi, No. 05-4761, CR-04385, 2006 US App. LEXIS 32554, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2006).
21. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003).
22. Id. at 359–60 (citations omitted).
23. See id. at 365–67 (explaining that cross-burning may be considered to be
either proscribable intimidation, or protected political speech, and declaring the
Virginia statute at issue unconstitutional for blurring the line between what is
proscribed and what is protected).
24. See id. at 361–62 (noting that the First Amendment protects most contentbased speech from governmental prohibition).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2000) (proscribing threats made against the President of
the United States).
26. See id. (stating any threat to the President “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both”).
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essential to prevent harm, which means the threat causes
consequences that should be discouraged through the risk of
prosecution.
II. GIVING MONEY TO TERRORISTS
What about when the expressive association is represented by the
act of giving money? Can non-violent financial supporters of
terrorists be constitutionally prosecuted? There is no question that
they can be. In 1994, Congress enacted the first “material support”
law, which criminalized the act of providing funds “knowing or
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying
27
out, [a terrorism crime].” This statute is constitutional, despite the
fact that the act of giving money is also an act of expression, because
28
it requires proof that the defendant intended to support violence.
29
This would seem to comport with Brandenburg.
The intent element of this first “material support” statute—the
price of it being obviously constitutional—is so exacting that the
statute has limited utility. Realizing this, Congress two years later
enacted the second material support crime statute, which prohibits
“knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign
30
It is this second statute—18 U.S.C.
terrorist organization . . . .”
§ 2339B—and the prosecutions arising under it that have generated
31
First Amendment litigation that continues to this day.
This is not particularly surprising. Where the designated foreign
terrorist organizations included Islamic groups, the First Amendment
issue was in some ways inevitable because Islamic law mandates that
members give alms, known as zakat, calculated on the basis of
32
accumulated wealth.
Thus, the giving of money to groups that
represent their objectives to be humanitarian complicates Western

27. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000).
28. See id. (proscribing material support to terrorists where the individual
“know[s] or intend[s] that [the material is] . . . to be used in preparation for, or in
carrying out” proscribed acts).
29. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that a state can
proscribe speech “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000). The courts sometimes refer to this statute as the
AEDPA—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Chandi, 514 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (involving
a defense by Chandi that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was unconstitutional because it violated
his First Amendment rights).
32. See Raj Bhala, Theological Categories for Special and Differential Treatment, 50 KAN.
L. REV. 635, 677 (discussing the five pillars of Islam: profession of faith, prayer, alms
(zakat), fasting, and pilgrimage).
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efforts to prevent the flow of funds to Islamic groups that both help
33
people and engage in violence, such as Hizballah and Hamas.
In enacting § 2339B, Congress intended to prohibit all financial
support to terrorist groups, including donations intended for purely
34
humanitarian purposes.
Persons who unwittingly provide such
funding cannot be prosecuted, since the statute requires the donor to
35
“knowing[ly]” support terrorism. The questions faced by the courts
included whether financial support for a group’s political or
36
humanitarian activities could be constitutionally criminalized.
The First Amendment challenge to the government’s ability to
prohibit the transfer of United States-based funds—“humanitarian”
funds—to designated terrorist organizations came in the form of one
37
prospective criminal prosecution and five actual ones.
The prospective one involved the claim by a charity that wanted to
support the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that
38
§ 2339B chills its freedom of association.
Plaintiffs claim that such support would be directed to aid only the
nonviolent humanitarian and political activities of the designated
organizations. Being prohibited from giving this support, they
argue, infringes their associational rights under the First
Amendment. Because the statute criminalizes the giving of
material support to an organization regardless of whether the
donor intends to further the organization’s unlawful ends,
39
plaintiffs claim it runs afoul of [the First Amendment].

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
40
this argument. As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski wrote,
The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the
designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the
political goals of the group. Plaintiffs are even free to praise the
groups for using terrorism as a means of achieving their ends.
What [§ 2339B] prohibits is the act of giving material support, and
33. See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th
Cir. 2007) (Hamas); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Hizballah).
34. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining Congress’s concern that terrorist organizations would
receive funding “under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise”) (internal
quotations omitted).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000).
36. See, e.g., Chandi, 514 F.3d at 371 (assessing the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, which criminalizes material support to terrorist organizations).
37. See infra notes 38, 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing the hypothetical
and actual cases, respectively).
38. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
39. Id. at 1133.
40. Id.
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there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving
terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their
grisly missions. Nor, of course, is there a right to provide resources
41
with which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives.

Money, it seems, is different from pure speech. Sure, the act of
transferring money has First Amendment symbolism. However,
money is also more difficult to control because it is fungible, which
means even donations that are motivated by benevolence can be
mixed with other receipts, thereby freeing up more proceeds which
terrorist groups may use to kill people. In addition, the government
limits what people can do with their money all the time. One cannot
give an unlimited amount of money to a political candidate of one’s
42
43
choice. One cannot buy Cuban cigars from Fidel Castro. What
you do with your money is not sacrosanct. Financial transactions may
be regulated and are regulated. This regulation is constitutional.
The government’s authority to regulate financial transactions is
supported by a long history of precedent, dealing with campaign
financing rules and the President’s embargo authority, among other
44
things.
The actual “material support” prosecutions involved people
charged with providing funds to Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian
45
Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), and worldwide Islamic jihad generally.
In
these cases, the courts denied the defendants’ First Amendment
claims, each of which was based on the argument that the
government cannot constitutionally limit the sending of funds to
46
terrorist organizations.
41. Id.
42. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1979) (holding the contribution
limitation to individual political candidates constitutional).
43. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6010 (2000) (codifying the trade embargo with Cuba
and providing sanctions for U.S. citizens and corporations that violate the embargo).
44. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (highlighting that restrictions
on campaign contributions and trade with Cuba are permissible impingements upon
one’s right to expend money as one sees fit).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that Hammoud was convicted on several counts for his support of
Hizballah); United States v. Marzook, No. 03 CR 0978, 2005 WL 3095543, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 17, 2005) (noting that the indictment was for the defendant’s alleged
assistance to Hamas); United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1328 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (noting that the accused allegedly supported the PIJ through operating and
directing fundraising activities in the United States).
46. See, e.g., Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 329 (rejecting the argument that § 2339B
impermissibly restricts the First Amendment right of association); United States v.
Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 2004452, at *1
(N.D. Tex. July 11, 2007) (rejecting the argument that that the government had
criminalized their religious obligation to engage in zakat-charitable giving); United
States v. Jayyousi, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 781373, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2007)
(stating that there is no First Amendment protection for providing resources
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When it comes to giving funds to terrorist organizations, it seems
the law is settled. Money—even “humanitarian money,” funds
intended for benevolent purposes—simply cannot go to foreign
groups that engage in political violence. People who knowingly defy
47
People can also be
this prohibition can be prosecuted.
constitutionally prosecuted for the separate crime of lying about their
48
terrorist-support activities.
There has yet to be a court that disagrees with this conclusion, yet
the argument that § 2339B infringes on speech and amounts to an
unconstitutional assessment of “guilt by association” has been pushed
49
time and time again, without success. When it comes to the act of
giving funds to designated terrorist groups, the constitutionality of
the § 2339B prohibition is so well established that it can be
50
considered a legal certainty.
III. WHAT ABOUT PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCIERS?
There is an aspect of American counterterrorism efforts that has
not been considered as much as criminal prosecutions:
the legal
remedies that permit private parties to sue terrorists in American
courts on behalf of the people they have killed and injured.
The civil counterpart to U.S. counterterrorism is just that, since its
power lies in its borrowing from § 2339B jurisprudence. Congress
saw fit to permit federal civil actions in American courts on behalf of
victims killed and injured by the actions of international terrorist
51
organizations. The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (“ATA”) provides:
knowing and/or intending that they will be used for terrorist activities); Marzook,
2005 WL 3095543, at *4–6 (rejecting the argument that the indictment impinges on
defendant’s First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association); Al-Arian,
308 F. Supp. 2d at 1341–42 (rejecting the argument that the indictment attempts to
criminalize their First Amendment rights of speech in support of and association
with the PIJ).
47. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that to be liable under
the statute a donor must know he is supporting terrorism).
48. Cf. United States v. Mubayyid, 476 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The
Court sees no reason why providing a complete and truthful description of the
organization’s planned activities in order to obtain tax-exempt status—whether or
not those activities are religiously motivated—inhibits or substantially burdens the
exercise of religious freedom.”).
49. See, e.g., supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
50. I am not referring to the “training,” “personnel,” and “expert assistance” type
of prohibited “material support,” where the constitutional issue is admittedly a closer
one. My argument that the constitutionality of § 2339B is clear involves its use
against those who provide funds to terrorists. I am also not referring to the question
of whether the terrorist designation system complies with principles of due process,
which is not a First Amendment issue.
51. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000)), rev’d, 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007)

1282

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1273

Any national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and . . . recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
52
including attorney’s fees.

With the advent of § 2339B, the terrorism-related statute extending
criminal culpability to those who provide humanitarian money to
terrorist groups, plaintiffs in the ATA cases realized that they were
also beneficiaries of the law because it extended liability to people in
the United States who have provided money to international rogues.
Like criminal defendants charged under § 2339B, the
organizations and individuals sued in these cases, and their
supporters cried foul, arguing that this civil remedy infringed on
53
their First Amendment rights.
A court that considered this
argument explained that the conduct defined by the criminal
material support statutes qualifies as an act of “international
terrorism” itself and therefore can establish civil liability under the
54
ATA. Thus, people sued under the ATA were stuck with the settled
jurisprudence on the constitutionality of § 2339B, and the ATA
55
plaintiffs were the beneficiaries. Thereafter, courts in the ATA cases
involving the transfer of money construed the pleadings according to
56
the law relating to § 2339B. This meant that banks could be sued
57
under the ATA for their financial transactions with terrorists.
It is ironic that these Islamic litigants so often cloak themselves in
58
First Amendment values, where Muslims so frequently seek through

(addressing a cause of action brought under the Antiterrorism Act to hold
defendants civilly liable for acts of international terrorism).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
53. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1016 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (stating that “§§ 2339A and 2339B clearly indicate that Congress did view
[material support]” as international terrorism for which the ATA provides a cause of
action).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(suing financial institutions for the plaintiffs’ injuries from terrorist activities).
56. See, e.g., id. (relying on § 2339B in dismissing claims of defendant bank, which
engaged in acts of international terrorism by providing material support to terrorist
organizations).
57. See, e.g., id. at 587 (“Section 2339B is violated if [a] Bank provides material
support in the form of financial services to a designated foreign terrorist
organization and the Bank either knows of the designation or knows that the
designated organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activities.”).
58. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(assessing Noah’s First Amendment claims alleging that AOL terminated his account
and failed to restore previous postings in order to prevent his and other Muslims proIslam speech); Islamic Soc’y of Boston v. Boston Herald, Inc., No. 05-4637, 2006 WL
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litigation to prevent the dissemination of information of which they
59
do not like. The First Amendment is not a one-way street. It is not a
weapon to defend your own speech and association while insisting on
the right to control that of others. The rule of law means neutral
operation and application of legal principles.
Is this happening with private terrorism lawsuits? It would be
disturbing if the individuals who argue that financing terrorism is
constitutional also simultaneously avail themselves of the legal
remedies they attack. Are the critics of § 2339B attacking the tools
Congress has granted victims of terrorism, while relying on them?
For example, following a recent decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in one of these civil cases,
the Council on American Islamic Relations (“CAIR”) issued a press
release that suggested the “rule of law” requires that the Muslim
organization defendants be exonerated:
The defendants in this case have endured a seven-year legal battle
in which their reputations have been smeared and their assets
confiscated. While the destruction of American Muslim groups
who have committed no wrong-doing is irreparable, today’s
decision, in which the rules of law were finally applied, helps
60
restore the American people’s trust in the system.

In fact, the opinion CAIR heralded was not a vindication for these
61
Muslim groups or a ruling that they committed no wrongdoing.
2423287, at *12 (Mass. Super. July 21, 2006) (addressing the First Amendment
argument for a right to petition).
59. See Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (addressing a defamation suit for Ballenger’s statement explaining that he
and his wife split in part because they lived across the street from CAIR); Global
Relief Found., Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 390 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving a
libel and slander lawsuit for reporting that the Global Relief Foundation was accused
of providing funds to Bin Laden); Ghafur v. Bernstein, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 627
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (addressing a libel suit for a letter stating that an investigation
into Ghafur should be made due to his ties with Islam); Talal v. Fanning, 506 F.
Supp. 186, 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (involving a suit about a television movie depicting
the execution of a Saudi Princess for adultery, alleging that it was defamatory to
Islam); Mumin v. Dees, 663 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Neb. 2003) (addressing a libel suit for
statements made concerning members of the Islamic Faith); Farrakhan v. N.Y.P.
Holdings, Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (assessing a libel suit
brought by Minister Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam against an article published
by the New York Post); Khan v. Newsweek, Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d 119, 119 (App. Div. 1990)
(involving a libel suit brought by Khan alleging libel based on an article published
that stated a businessman was linked to arms dealing in a new business in Peshawar).
60. Press Release, CAIR, CAIR Welcomes Overturning of $156M Judgment in
Charity Case (Dec. 28, 2007), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?mid1=
777&&ArticleID=24013&&name=n&&currPage=1 [hereinafter CAIR Press Release]
(discussing Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th
Cir. 2007)).
61. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir.
2007) (remanding for a determination of causation).
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Rather, the case was a remand back to the trial court with instructions
on how the plaintiffs—whose son was killed in 1996 by Hamas, which
was allegedly aided by financial contributions of persons and
organizations within the United States—could satisfy the causation
62
What about these
element to the Seventh Circuit’s satisfaction.
defendants? One of them, the Holy Land Foundation (“HLF”), was
described by the Seventh Circuit in a manner that hardly suggests, as
CAIR asserted, it was wrongly accused:
The ample record evidence (particularly taking into account the
classified information presented to the court in camera) establishing
HLF’s role in the funding of Hamas and of its terrorist activities is
incontrovertible. . . . Even following the district court’s judgment,
while HLF attempted to supplement the record on appeal, the
supplementary material could not have defeated the proposition
established by the record evidence that Holy Land was a funder of
63
the terrorist organization Hamas.
64

So what does CAIR mean when it refers to the “rules of law”? Is it
referring to legal certainty and the application of neutral principles
to different people—such as the notion that the U.S. government can
constitutionally prevent people from giving money to Hamas? If so,
this is not something CAIR or the American Civil Liberties Union
65
66
(“ACLU”) believes has been sufficiently settled.
The rule of law, understood in the context of civil lawsuits,
properly suggests that the jurisprudence that has settled the
constitutionality of § 2339B would allow groups like CAIR and the
ACLU to avail themselves of the same tort remedies being used
against various Muslim groups—those accused of supporting
Hamas—to sue people they believed to be international villains. The
problem is that if they have done so, they cannot very well attack
those legal remedies as being unconstitutional, without being fairly
62. Id.
63. Id. at 724.
64. CAIR Press Release, supra note 60.
65. On December 11, 2007, the ACLU disseminated the following statement:
Some of [the terms of § 2339B] are so sweeping that they encompass activity
that is protected by the First Amendment . . . . In its current form, the
statute allows a person to be criminally prosecuted for donations that may be
entirely innocent, because the statute fails to require the government to
show that the donor actually intended to support illegal activity. We
continue to believe that, in its current form, the entire law is
unconstitutional.
Press Release, ACLU, Court Rules “Material Support” Provision of Patriot Act
Unconstitutional (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/33115prs
20071211.html.
66. See id. (“We continue to believe that, in its current form, the entire law is
unconstitutional.”).
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accused of hypocrisy. The rule of law surely cannot mean that the
legal remedies are constitutional when they are useful to you but are
otherwise constitutionally infirm.
Has this happened? Consider that the Center for Constitutional
Rights (“CCR”), the organization employing the lawyers who have
most vehemently argued that material support statutes are
unconstitutional, has represented plaintiffs suing an American
67
As a
equipment manufacturer for products it shipped to Israel.
further example, a lawyer who argued that the government could not
constitutionally limit support to the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan
68
Worker’s Party also served as the plaintiffs’ attorney in lawsuits
seeking damages on behalf of an economist killed by Chilean military
69
70
officers, persons injured and killed by Ethiopian guards,
71
72
Argentinean soldiers, and El Salvadorian death squads, as well as
Burmese villagers dislocated as a result of a pipeline involving
73
Unocal. The ACLU, which has continued to argue that § 2339B

67. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2005),
aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
68. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting the argument that prohibiting support to terrorist organizations violates First
Amendment freedom of association rights).
69. See Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d,
402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) (addressing plaintiffs’ argument that defendant may
be liable for indirect participation, or for aiding and abetting others in the
commission of various human rights abuses); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios,
157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350–51 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (explaining procedural history of
plaintiffs’ suit against defendant for crimes against humanity).
70. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–46 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing
cruel and inhumane acts for which appellant Ethiopian guard was being charged);
Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304, at *4 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
(declaring defendant Ethiopian guard responsible for acts that he personally
committed and for acts that he ordered, aided and abetted, or participated in).
71. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.
1992) (elaborating on plaintiff’s argument that Argentina was responsible for official
acts of torture committed by military personnel stemming from religious
persecution).
72. See Kline v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D.D.C. 1985)
(summarizing plaintiff’s complaint against not only El Salvador for the acts
committed by its agents, but also against U.S. officials for failure to investigate
adequately and report victim’s death).
73. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000), rev’d,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering
plaintiffs’ claim that Unocal was liable for human rights violations committed against
them by Burmese military officials acting in furtherance of an oil pipeline project
involving Unocal); Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (entertaining a cause of action against defendant Unocal for acts
committed by Burmese agents against Burmese villagers because of Unocal’s alleged
implied partnership with the Burmese government).
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violates the First Amendment, has similarly brought lawsuits against a
74
number of international villains.
Of course, many of these cases may be distinguished from the
terrorist-financing ATA cases because they sought damages directly
from individuals who themselves engaged in the violent acts abroad,
75
This
rather than those who provided them support stateside.
distinction, however, would not explain the position the ACLU and
the CCR took in civil lawsuits involving American entities that
76
provided support to the Apartheid regime in South Africa and
77
Israel.
To appreciate this inconsistency, one must visit the arguments. In
78
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, a private citizen sued the HLF,
79
which invoked the First Amendment right of free association. The
HLF argued that “[t]o allow a cause of action to proceed against a
charitable organization, absent any meaningful allegation of
involvement in terrorist acts or intent to fund terrorist activity, chills
the organization’s ability to raise funds and provide relief to those in
80
desperate need of humanitarian aid.”
Essentially, the plaintiff’s claim was that any individual or group
that donates money for lawful, humanitarian purposes in areas of the
world in which terrorist organizations operate, from Northern

74. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 844 (ACLU representing a plaintiff against an
Ethiopian guard charged with leadership and participation in a campaign of torture
and violence known as the “Red Terror”); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1327–29 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (ACLU representing a plaintiff against a former
Bosnian Serb police officer for acts of brutality directed at and committed against
Bosnian non-Serbs); Kline, 603 F. Supp. at 1314 (ACLU representing a plaintiff
against El Salvador for acts committed by its soldiers and against U.S. officials for
allegedly covering up the events surrounding the victim’s death).
75. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (listing numerous cases).
76. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.
2007) (stating plaintiffs’ position that several corporate defendants were responsible
for cooperating with the South African government in maintaining apartheid).
77. See generally Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022–23 (W.D.
Wash. 2005) (plaintiffs contending that Caterpillar should be liable for their family
member’s death, since it provided the bulldozers to Israel), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th
Cir. 2007). The fact that the U.S. government sought dismissal of the lawsuit on
foreign policy grounds does not indicate that it is guilty of the same inconsistency I
have highlighted in this Article. The basis for the government’s position in Corrie did
not include the argument that § 2339B is unconstitutional, which I agree would be
disingenuous. If the United States took such position that the lawsuit seeks to hold
Caterpillar liable for First Amendment-protected activity, the inconsistency might be
fairly argued. It did not.
78. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 1007.
80. Brief of the Appellants at 39, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000
(7th Cir. 2002), Nos. 01-1969 and 01-1970, 2001 WL 34106475, at *39.
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Ireland to Sri Lanka, can and may be sued for civil damages by U.S.
81
victims of violence far from U.S. shores.
The amicus brief filed by the CCR in Boim disagreed, arguing that
“Section 2339B penalizes financial contributions to any designated
foreign terrorist organization, regardless of whether they are directed
towards the organization’s legitimate political and humanitarian
82
activities or its illegal activities.” However, as described in Part I of
this Article, above, the application of § 2339B to prohibit giving
83
money to terrorist groups does not violate the First Amendment.
84
The Israel case, Corrie v. Caterpillar, involved a lawsuit against the
Caterpillar company by the family of Rachel Corrie, an American
peace activist killed by the Israel Defense Forces with a Caterpillar85
provided bulldozer. The CCR represented the plaintiffs, arguing
that imposition of civil liability on Caterpillar was appropriate
because its action gave substantial assistance to Israel toward the
86
accomplishment of a tortious result. This standard of liability, the
CCR argued, did not impose liability by association nor did it erect
87
vicarious or strict liability.
“[I]mposing liability for knowingly
providing substantial assistance in the commission of internationally
wrongful conduct requires no revolutionary insight. It only requires
faithful adherence to the understanding of the [American law] at its
88
inception and the application of modern common law principles.”
Meanwhile, however, the CCR filed an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiffs’ case in the South Africa Apartheid case, Khulumani v.
89
Barclay National Bank, Ltd.

81. See id. at *3 (stating that U.S. law, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, provides a legal remedy
for U.S. citizens who are victims of terrorism violence and that those individuals who
aid the terrorists may be held liable under the law).
82. Amici Curiae Brief of the National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom and
the Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of Defendants-Appellants’ Appeal
from the Denial of Their Motions to Dismiss the Complaint at 25, Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (No. 00 C 2905), 2001 WL 34106476, at
*25.
83. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (explaining that the freedom of
association can extend to financial transactions but is not absolute by any means).
84. 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
85. Id. at 1022–23.
86. Id. at 1023.
87. See id. at 1024 (noting Caterpillar’s argument that it could not be liable for
merely doing business with Israel).
88. Jeff Breinholt, J’Accuse: Lawfare Lawyers Storming the Courts, ACCURACY IN
MEDIA, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.aim.org/guest-column/jaccuse-lawfare-lawyersstorming-the-courts.
89. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007)
(arguing that defendants actively worked with the South African government in
perpetuating the Apartheid system of government).
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How can these seemingly conflicting positions be harmonized?
One argument for the CCR is that the Khulumani and Corrie lawsuits
were brought under a different statute than what was in play in Boim,
and the former did not depend on § 2339B to establish liability by the
90
defendants. However, their constitutional arguments in the § 2339B
and ATA cases cannot be limited to the statute, since the claims in
Khulumani and Corrie sought to do the same thing that the ATA did
for the plaintiffs in Boim—extend liability to people uninvolved in the
direct violence, whose only role was providing the resources that
91
made the violence possible.
In other words, if § 2339B is
unconstitutional because of this impact, so is the application of any
other statute that has the exact same impact in a particular case.
In response to this argument, the CCR might argue that the
plaintiffs in Khulumani and Corrie had to prove the foreseeability to
the defendants of the consequences of providing support. This legal
requirement distinguishes those two cases from Boim. About the
Corrie lawsuit, Jennifer Green, Senior Attorney for CCR, stated,
“International law clearly provides that corporations can be held
accountable for violations of international human rights. Rachel
Corrie, a young American killed abroad because Caterpillar
purposefully turns a blind eye as to how their products are used, must
92
have access to justice.”
However, foreseeability is exactly what the § 2339B designation
process was intended to instill; with the designation of Hamas,
everyone is on constructive or actual notice that terrorist acts by
Hamas are a foreseeable consequence of providing money to Hamas.
If anything, foreseeability is even greater in the conduct alleged in
Boim. Because the United States has made the former illegal per se,
an individual who provides funds to Hamas causes more foreseeable,
and therefore greater, harm than does an individual who provides
bulldozers to the Israeli government or banking services to the
Apartheid government of South Africa. Judged this way, the Boim
lawsuit presents First Amendment issues of less magnitude than Corrie
and Khulumani. Still, to groups like the CCR, Boim reflects an

90. Compare Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258 (Alien Tort Claims Act), and Corrie, 403
F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (Torture Victim Protection Act), with Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (18 U.S.C. § 2333).
91. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1000–03 (stating that the Boims argue that the
defendants should be held liable for their son’s death due to the defendants’
financial support of Hamas, a known terrorist organization).
92. Arab America Media Services, Rachel Corrie’s Family Files Lawsuit Against
Caterpillar (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.aams.blogspot.com/2005/03/rachel-corriesfamily-files-lawsuit.html.

2008]

RESOLVED, OR IS IT?

1289

unconstitutional application of § 2339B in the civil context, whereas
the lawsuits in the other cases should be permitted. That is a bizarre
double standard which, to my knowledge, has never been discussed
publicly.
For these lawyers to continue to decry the constitutionality of
93
§ 2339B is thus not merely wishful thinking, but an attempt to
establish a double standard. The implications of their arguments are
anomalous. If they were to succeed in getting § 2339B declared
unconstitutional (an unlikely prospect given all that has been
decided), they will be a victim of their own success. The very lawsuits
they champion would fall by the wayside.
To be sure, one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom
fighter. However, arguing that civil remedies are unconstitutional
while simultaneously relying on those same remedies for one’s pet
causes is hypocritical and problematic. If the rule of law requires
legal certainty and the application of rules across the board, these
lawyers cannot have it both ways.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the United States can constitutionally limit where one
sends money. After all, it happens all the time, in a variety of
different regulatory contexts. This authority must be exercised in the
area of terrorism if the United States wants to maintain its leadership
role in the civilized world. Despite my criticism of those who argue
that § 2339 and the corresponding civil remedies are
93. It seems this wishful thinking is even exhibited in this very law review issue.
Professor David Cole’s commentary indeed claims that the material support crime
cannot be constitutionally applied to the act of giving money, despite all that has
been decided. See David Cole, Anti-Terrorism on Trial; Why the Government Loses
Funding Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2007, at A19 (“For all practical purposes, the
[material support] law imposes guilt by association.”). He also argues, curiously, that
there was no evidence that the defendants in the Holy Land Foundation prosecution
provided money to Hamas (which would raise the question of why the defendant’s
motion for acquittal was denied by the court and the case sent to the jury) and that it
was denied the opportunity to present exonerating evidence that the Holy Land
Foundation was not affiliated with Hamas in the civil challenge to its December 2001
designation. Id. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion referred to the evidence presented by
the organization, which means that it is hardly true that it was denied this
opportunity. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164–66
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Holy Land did respond and the Treasury considered its response
as well as the new evidence before deciding to redesignate HLF in May 2002. . . .
HLF has had every opportunity to come forward with some showing that that
evidence is false or even that its ties to Hamas had been severed.”). Significantly, the
D.C. Circuit referred to the Holy Land Foundation-Hamas link as “incontrovertible,”
which seems to be inconsistent with Professor Cole’s claim that there was “no
evidence” of such a link. See id. at 165–66 (stating that the supplemental evidence
HLF provided on appeal, while ultimately rejected from the administrative review
claim, “would have made no difference”).
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unconstitutional in the face of what has become the legal certainty of
its constitutionality, I am not critical of their efforts to seek justice on
behalf of aggrieved victims of international crime. In fact, I
commend them for these courageous lawsuits and wish them well. In
fact, I cringe whenever the United States seeks dismissal of these cases
on foreign policy grounds. What I do criticize is the tendency for
certain lawyers to talk out of both sides of their mouths. The law is
settled. It is high time to get on with enforcing it more aggressively
against international outlaws of all political stripes. Hopefully, the
next President, no matter his or her political party, will agree.
As we enter into the second decade of a terrorist financing regime
that involves a system of publicly designating international terrorist
organizations, the law is far clearer than it might have been in
October 1997, when the first round of designated foreign terrorist
organizations was announced. This clarity not only helps people like
me involved in criminal justice, but it is also a boost for people who
seek to fight all brands of international violence through the
American tort system. These two sides have not yet come together,
which is a shame. Imagine how powerful our various legal remedies
would be if the U.S. intelligence community had access to
information developed by private lawyers in these matters and vice
versa. I hope that is what the future holds. Yes, I am suggesting that
the fields of human rights and counterterrorism be joined.
One way of getting there is to firmly understand that the law is
settled on whether the United States and her private lawyers can hold
unscrupulous people responsible for what they do with their money
and get busy with the tough task of litigating their liability.

